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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the legal sphere, some of the most dominant elements of 
President Donald Trump’s first year in office were his executive 
orders. This article focuses on the following (the “Trump Executive 
Orders”): the three travel ban orders,1 the sanctuary jurisdictions 
order,2 the two successive transgender military exclusion 
memoranda,3 and the Attorney General statement indicating 
rescission of the Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
program.4 These orders attracted much national media attention 
and were clearly intended to produce political effects. As a 
presidential candidate, Trump campaigned for a ban on Muslim 
immigration5 and a wall at the United States-Mexico border,6 and 
made other statements that solidified support among his populist 
base.7 
1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. See infra Part II.D. Although President Trump’s memorandum on
transgender military exclusion and the statement from Attorney General Sessions 
on DACA are not technically executive orders, they are intended to have legal 
effects in the executive branch, and are accordingly treated in this article as akin to 
executive orders. The memorandum and DACA statement are encompassed 
whenever this article references the Trump Executive Orders. 
5. Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN (Dec.
8, 2015, 3:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-
muslim-ban-immigration/index.html [https://perma.cc/CNM7-AYN5] (discussing 
candidate Trump’s press release calling for a “total and complete shutdown of 
Muslims entering the United States”). 
6. See Politico Staff, Full Text: Donald Trump Immigration Speech in Arizona,
POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-
trump-immigration-address-transcript-227614 [https://perma.cc/5ZDA-K3XW] 
(announcing campaign promise to build a wall). 
7. See Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of
Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash 5 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Working 
Paper RWP16-026, 2016), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.a 
spx?Id=1401 [https://perma.cc/PTZ2-Y36E] (“[Trump’s] populism is rooted in 
claims that he is an outsider to D.C. politics, a self-made billionaire leading an 
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The Trump Executive Orders, as efforts to fulfill some of these 
promises made during the campaign, have significant political roots. 
As documents designed to have legal force and effect, they also have 
legal significance. Taken together, they demonstrate a strong desire 
to exclude certain populations and entities from the benefits of 
being part of American society. The Trump Executive Orders reflect 
the exclusionary bent of his populism. As a political proposition, 
calling to exclude the outsider benefitted Trump’s candidacy. But, 
as a principle of presidential legal action, it has been problematic. 
Federal courts have been hostile to most of the Trump Executive 
Orders,8 and with respect to DACA, a federal court’s initial 
invalidation of the related Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program left the door 
open to continued operation of DACA.9 
The courts’ decisions indicate somewhat ironic results. The 
exclusionary effect of the Trump Executive Orders is, in a sense, an 
effort to “turn the clock back” in the affected subject-matter areas. 
That is, they intended to halt the momentum built during President 
Obama’s years in office and to begin movement in the opposite 
direction.10 Through enjoining these orders, federal courts are 
making analytical strides that move constitutional doctrine in a 
direction that conforms more with the momentum that the Trump 
administration is battling.11 While the Trump administration has 
been trying to halt momentum toward liberalization in the political 
realm, some courts have been developing new doctrines moving 
liberalization forward in the judicial realm.12 This article attempts to 
insurgency movement on behalf of ordinary Americans disgusted with the corrupt 
establishment, incompetent politicians, dishonest Wall Street speculators, arrogant 
intellectuals, and politically correct liberals.”). 
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part IV.D.1.
10. See Peter Baker, Can Trump Destroy Obama’s Legacy?, N.Y. TIMES (June
23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/sunday-review/donald-trump-
barack-obama.html [https://perma.cc/3H2X-GHWH] (“The president seems 
determined to define his time in office by demolishing what his predecessor did.”). 
11. E.g., Jesse Lempel, Tier III Terrorist Designations: The Trump Administration
and Courts Move in Opposite Directions, LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2017), https://lawfareblog. 
com/tier-iii-terrorist-designations-trump-administration-and-courts-move-opposite-
directions [https://perma.cc/TA5P-Z3NU] (“[T]he administration’s boost to the 
[Patriot Act’s] system [of granting the President unilateral authority] runs counter 
to the trend in the courts expressing   skepticism—if not outright alarm—at the 
sweeping and unpredictable application of immigration bars . . . .”). 
12. See infra Part IV.
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describe, and point to the irony of, courts using doctrinal expansion 
and novel interpretation in ways that run counter to President 
Trump’s exclusionary agenda. 
II. TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDERS
As others have noted, virtually all U.S. presidents have issued 
executive orders.13 There is nothing unconstitutional, per se, about 
a president issuing an executive order. However, any particular 
executive order with terms or effects that violate one of the 
proscriptions of the Constitution (such as the First Amendment or 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) is, of course, 
unconstitutional. And all executive orders unsupported by 
Congressional authorization are constitutionally valid only if they 
stay within the scope of legitimate executive authority.14 
A. Travel Ban Orders 
The three travel bans are probably the most notorious of the 
Trump Executive Orders—no doubt owing in part to the successive 
judicial invalidations of the first two, and their replacement by the 
third.15  
1. First Travel Ban Order
Soon after the start of his administration, President Trump 
issued the first travel ban order, Executive Order 13769.16 This order 
13. John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Executive Orders: Washington – Trump, AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/order 
s.php [https://perma.cc/CE23-9KST] (identifying that only William Henry
Harrison failed to issue an executive order during his term and no president since 
Chester Arthur has issued fewer than one hundred executive orders). 
14. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own 
independent powers . . . .”). 
15. See generally Jaweed Kaleem, From ‘See You in Court!’ to the Supreme Court: Who’s
Up and Down in the History of Trump’s Travel Ban, LA TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/immigration/la-na-travel-ban-history-2017-htmlst 
ory.html [http://perma.cc/8ZTU-LXCN] (providing a cursory overview of history 
regarding the Trump travel bans). 
16. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter First Travel 
Ban Order]. 
4
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barred entry of aliens from seven specified countries (with majority 
Muslim populations) 17 into the United States for a period of ninety 
days.18 It also reduced the number of refugees to be admitted in 2017 
by over fifty percent,19 barred the entry of Syrian refugees into the 
United States indefinitely,20 and imposed a 120-day suspension of the 
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.21 
A salient feature of the first travel ban order was that it directed 
the Secretary of State to prioritize refugee claims by individuals on 
the basis of religion-based persecution when they were adherents of 
a religion that was a minority religion in their home country.22 This 
was widely perceived as a measure that favored Christian immigrants 
arriving from majority-Muslim countries.23 A federal district court 
judge in Seattle imposed an injunction on the first travel ban order,24 
for reasons discussed below,25 and this injunction was sustained by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.26 
17. See Kyle Blaine & Julia Horowitz, How the Trump Administration Chose the 7
Countries in the Immigration Executive Order, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/how-the-trump-administration-chose-
the-7-countries/index.html [https://perma.cc/939G-R8MV] (noting that the 
countries of Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen were all affected by 
the ban). 
18. First Travel Ban Order, supra note 16, § 3(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8978.
19. Id. § 5(d), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8979 (permitting entry of no more than fifty
thousand refugees). 
20. Id. § 5(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8979.
21. Id. § 5(a), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8979.
22. Id. § 5(e), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8979 (“[T]he Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security may jointly determine to admit individuals to the United States as refugees 
on a case-by-case basis . . . including when the person is a religious minority in his 
country of nationality facing religious persecution.”). 
23. See Richard Gonzales, Trump’s Refugee Plan Will Prioritize Christians
Suffering Religious Persecution, NPR (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
thetwo-way/2017/01/26/511903885/trump-s-refugee-plan-will-prioritize-christian- 
refugees [https://perma.cc/BMD2-Q6XH] (“[T]he actions include a 120-day 
moratorium on any new refugees entering the United States to give the government 
time to come up with a plan that prioritizes Christians suffering from religious 
persecution.”). 
24. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-014IJLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). 
25. See infra Part IV.A.
26. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
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2. Second Travel Ban Order
The Trump administration issued the second travel ban order27 
to replace the first. Again, it provided for a temporary ban on entry 
of immigrants from specifically named Muslim-majority countries 
for a ninety-day period,28 but with terms adjusted, ostensibly to 
address the defects criticized by the courts. This second order 
reduced the number of countries affected to six,29 did not include 
an indefinite ban on entry by Syrian refugees, and eliminated the 
provision perceived to aid Christians from majority-Muslim states. 
This second travel ban order was in turn enjoined by federal district 
court judges in Maryland and Hawaii.30 These injunctions were 
upheld by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, respectively.31 The United 
States Supreme Court initially granted certiorari on both cases, but 
then vacated the earlier rulings upon determining that, with the 
expiration of the relevant ninety-day periods, the issues were moot.32 
3. Third Travel Ban Order
On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued a presidential 
proclamation putatively setting forth a permanent version of the 
travel ban,33 limiting immigration from eight specified countries.34 
This version of the travel ban was enjoined by a federal district court 
judge in Maryland on October 17, 2017.35 Shortly thereafter, the 
27. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,
Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Second 
Travel Ban Order]. 
28. Id. § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213.
29. Id. (limiting the banned countries to Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
and Yemen). 
30. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md.
2017); Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017). 
31. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017);
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017). 
32. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S.Ct. 353 (2017); Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 377 (2017). 
33. Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted
Entry into the United States by Terrorist or Other Public-Safety Threats, 
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Third 
Travel Ban Order]. 
34. Id. § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45165–67 (suspending immigration from the
countries of Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen). 
35. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 633 (D. Md.
2017). 
6
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Supreme Court stayed the injunction pending review by the Fourth 
Circuit, and potentially by the Supreme Court itself.36 As of this 
writing, the Fourth Circuit has issued no appellate opinion in the 
case. 
Also on October 17, 2017, a federal district judge in Hawaii 
enjoined the third version of the travel ban.37 This injunction, 
although stayed by the Supreme Court,38 was confirmed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.39 The federal 
government petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in 
the Hawaii case—which was granted on January 19, 2018—and oral 
argument took place on April 25, 2018.40 
B. Sanctuary Jurisdictions Order 
A number of cities and counties in various parts of the United 
States have policies limiting their cooperation in certain respects 
with federal immigration authorities.41 Such cities and counties are 
often referred to as “sanctuary jurisdictions.”42 Even before President 
Trump issued the first travel ban order, he issued an executive order 
designed to inhibit cities and counties from limiting their 
cooperation in key respects.43 The order directs the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and the Attorney General to “ensure” that 
36. Order Granting Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal, Trump v. Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, No. 17A560 (Dec. 4, 2017), https://cases.justia.com/federal/di 
strictcourts/maryland/mddce/8:2017cv00361/379052/237/0.pdf?ts=1512637567 
[https://perma.cc/V7MV-355H]. Specifically, the Court stayed the injunction 
“pending disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and disposition of the Government’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari if such writ is sought.” Id. 
37. Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1160 (D. Haw. 2017).
38. Order Granting Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal, Trump v. Hawaii, No.
17A550 (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/1204 
17zr_4gd5.pdf [https://perma.cc/65QX-QTLP]. The terms of this order were 
substantially identical to those of the order in the International Refugee Assistance 
Project case. 
39. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 702 (9th Cir. 2017).
40. Trump v. Hawaii, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/ca
ses/trump-v-hawaii-3/ [https://perma.cc/2E9C-BHAD] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
41. Jennifer C. Critchley & Lisa J. Trembly, Historical Review, Current Status and
Legal Considerations Regarding Sanctuary Cities, 306 N.J. LAW. 32, 34 (June 2017) 
(estimating there are between 300–350 sanctuary cities in the U.S.). 
42. Id. at 32.
43. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order
No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
7
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jurisdictions that do not supply information to federal immigration 
authorities be “[in]eligible to receive federal grants.”44 
In response to litigation initiated by Santa Clara County and the 
City and County of San Francisco,45 a judge sitting on the Federal 
District Court for the Northern District of California issued a 
nationwide injunction against the sanctuary jurisdictions executive 
order.46 The judge made this injunction permanent in a separate 
order granting summary judgment on November 20, 2017.47 
Early 2018 saw additional litigation concerning the sanctuary 
jurisdictions executive order. In the first few months of 2018, four 
federal courts issued notable opinions connected to the executive 
order, although they differ in an observable respect from the 2017 
opinions for the Santa Clara/San Francisco case. These courts did 
not address enforcement of the sanctuary jurisdictions executive 
order itself. Rather, they addressed determinations by the 
Attorney General to withhold funding—under specific federal 
programs—from the relevant jurisdictions because they were 
sanctuary jurisdictions. The two programs involved were the Edward 
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (often called the 
“Byrne JAG” Program),48 and grants issued by the Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services (often called “COPS” 
grants).49 
In one of these cases,50 the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania initially granted a preliminary 
injunction against the Attorney General from rejecting, on sanctuary 
jurisdiction grounds, the application submitted by the City of 
Philadelphia under the Byrne JAG Program.51 The court also 
enjoined the Attorney General from so withholding any funding to 
44. Id. § 9(a) at 8801.
45. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19,
2017). 
46. Id. at 540.
47. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00574-WHO, No. 17-cv-00485-
WHO, 2017 WL 5569835, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017). 
48. This program is administered pursuant to 34 U.S.C. §§ 10151–10158.
49. The basis for COPS grants is apparently internal within the Department of
Justice, as opposed to expressly statutory. See About, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CMTY.
ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., https://cops.usdoj.gov/about [https://perma.cc/BS94-
365B]. 
50. City of Phila. v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, 2018 WL 1305789 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13,
2018). 
51. See id. at *4.
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the City under that program.52 The court then denied the 
government’s motion to dismiss the City’s complaint.53 
In the second case,54 the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California granted partial summary judgment to 
the City of Los Angeles against the Attorney General, enjoining him 
from imposing conditions on the City’s receipt of COPS grants that 
were rooted in the sanctuary jurisdictions executive order.55 
In the third case,56 a panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction preventing 
the Attorney General from imposing certain conditions, rooted in 
the executive order, on the City of Chicago in its effort to obtain 
Byrne JAG Program funds.57 
The fourth case58 was a bit of an outlier. It was brought by the 
State of California, rather than a city, and the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California denied the State’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction.59 Unlike the other cases 
described in this section, this result was substantially in favor of the 
government. 
C. Transgender Military Exclusion Memoranda 
On August 25, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum60 
that embodied three primary effects. First, it indefinitely extended 
the previous temporary prohibition against transgender individuals 
entering the military.61 Second, it required the military to authorize, 
no later than March 23, 2018, the discharge of transgender service 
members.62 These two measures are sometimes referred to as the 
52. Id.
53. Id. at *13.
54. City of L.A. v. Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1087 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2018).
55. Id. at 1101.
56. City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 2018).
57. See id. at 293 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in issuing the preliminary injunction). 
58. California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
5, 2018). 
59. Id. at 1037.
60. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 2017 DAILY 
COMP. PRESS DOC. 587 (Aug. 25, 2017) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-
201700587/pdf/DCPD-201700587.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BNG-QGUM]. 
61. Id. § 2(a).
62. Id. § 3.
9
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“Accession Directive” and the “Retention Directive,”63 respectively. 
Third, the memorandum prohibited the expenditure of military 
resources on sex reassignment surgeries.64   
Four federal district courts enjoined the transgender military 
exclusion memorandum: the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia,65 the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland,66 the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington,67 and the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California.68 
In February 2018, the Department of Defense issued a 
document titled “Report and Recommendations on Military Service 
by Transgender Persons.”69 It announced three elements of a new 
63. See Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17–1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at *1.
64. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, supra note
60, § 2(b). 
65. Doe 1, 2017 WL 4873042, at *33. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia later denied an emergency motion for an administrative 
stay pending appeal. Doe 1 v. Trump, 2017 WL 6553389, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 
2017). 
66. Stone v. Trump, No. MJG-17-2459, 2017 WL 5589122, at *16 (D. Md. Nov.
21, 2017). 
67. Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *10 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 11, 2017). The court also denied a subsequent defense motion for 
clarification and partial stay, Karnoski v. Trump, C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6733723, 
at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 29, 2017), and a later defense motion for a continuance 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). Karnoski v. Trump, 2018 WL 993973, 
at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 21, 2018). 
68. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Stockman v. Trump, No. 5:17-1799 JGB, at 21 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 22, 2017); see Second Court Rejects Trump Bid to Stop Transgender Military Recruits, 
REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-
transgender/second-court-rejects-trump-bid-to-stop-transgender-military-recruits-
idUSKBN1EH00R [https://perma.cc/EGK5-GZUD] (last visited June 20, 2018): 
Also on Friday [December 22], a federal trial court in Riverside, 
California, blocked the ban while the case proceeds, making it the 
fourth to do so, after similar rulings in Baltimore, Seattle and 
Washington, D.C. U.S. District Judge Jesus Bernal said without the 
injunction the plaintiffs, including current and aspiring service 
members, would suffer irreparable harm. “There is nothing any court 
can do to remedy a government-sent message that some citizens are not 
worthy of the military uniform simply because of their gender,” he 
added. 
69. Declaration of Ryan B. Parker, Karnoski v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-1297-MJP,
Exhibit 2, at 10 (Mar. 23, 2018), militarypartners.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 
10
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“transgender policy,” all of which were overtly hostile to military 
service by transgender persons. The first element of the policy was 
that “transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria, who are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all 
other Service members, in their biological sex.”70 The second 
element was that “transgender persons who require or have 
undergone gender transition are disqualified.”71 And the third 
element was that “transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of 
gender dysphoria are disqualified, except under certain limited 
circumstances.”72 
On March 23, 2018, President Trump issued a new 
memorandum, in light of this document.73 In his new 
memorandum, he first revoked his earlier memorandum regarding 
military service by transgender persons from August 25, 2017.74 The 
memorandum then stated that the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security “may exercise their authority to 
implement any appropriate policies concerning military service by 
transgender individuals.”75 This language, which at first glance may 
seem rather mild in view of the condemnatory tone and effects of 
the February report, may have been intended to help facilitate 
implementation of the February 2018 policy. On April 13, 2018, the 
District Court for the Western District of Washington granted in part 
and denied in part the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ opposing motions 
for summary judgment.76 
D. DACA Rescission Statement 
DACA was originally set forth by former Secretary of Homeland 
Security Janet Napolitano in a June 15, 2012 memorandum, 
charging certain members of her staff with particular immigration 
03/March-23-policy-implementation.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR8X-DBG7]. 
70. Id. at 32.
71. Id. at 32–41.
72. Id. at 41–43 (detailing the limited circumstances exempted from the third
element of the transgender policy). 
73. Id. at Exhibit 3.
74. Id. § 1.
75. Id. § 2.
76. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ and Washington’s
Motions for Summary Judgment, Karnoski v. Trump, 2018 WL 1784464, at *14 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018). 
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duties.77 It was thematically linked to the DAPA program.78 Neither 
program was specifically authorized by congressional action, but the 
Obama administration took the position that both were mere 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion.79 
The DAPA program was designed to provide leniency for 
undocumented adults whose minor children were born in the 
United States (and were therefore U.S. citizens) or whose minor 
children were otherwise U.S. legal residents.80 The DACA program 
provides leniency for certain undocumented young U.S. residents 
who were brought to the United States as young minors and evinced 
certain positive indicators.81 
In 2015, a federal district court in Texas enjoined the DAPA 
program.82 The Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction,83 and that 
judgment was in turn upheld by an evenly divided Supreme Court.84 
The Trump administration rescinded the DACA program during its 
first year in office, thereby discontinuing any governmental attempt 
to defend the policy.85 The move was taken in a statement by 
77. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec’y of Dept. of Homeland
Sec. to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r of U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. 
(June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLH9-
VLFH]. 
78. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Dept. of Homeland Sec. to
Leo Rodriguez, Dir. of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv.’s et. al. (Nov. 20, 
2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_de 
ferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC9V-WVP2]. 
79. See, e.g., 2014 Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/archive/2014-executive-actions-
immigration [https://perma.cc/EN7H-3LWS] (last visited June 20, 2018) 
(outlining President Obama’s position on expansion of DACA and DAPA); 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 
2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/rema 
rks-president-immigration [https://perma.cc/HJF4-7Z5T] (discussing his support 
of Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum). 
80. Johnson, supra note 78.
81. Napolitano, supra note 77.
82. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
83. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015).
84. Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
85. Full Text: Jeff Sessions on Trump Ending DACA Program, POLITICO (Sept. 5,
2017) https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/05/trump-ending-daca-dreamers-
program-sessions-transcript-242326 [https://perma.cc/Q8UL-EPM3] [hereinafter 
DACA Rescission Statement]. 
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Attorney General Jeff Sessions on September 5, 2017.86 Other 
governmental statements indicated that the rescission would not be 
completely effective until March 2018, thereby giving Congress a 
chance to provide analogous relief in statutory form.87 
Two federal district courts then enjoined most of the operative 
prospective effect of the DACA rescission: the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California on January 9, 2018,88 
and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York on February 13, 2018.89 In the California case, the 
government asked the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari before 
judgment—that is, before the Ninth Circuit could have an 
opportunity to review on appeal.90 On February 26, 2018, the 
Supreme Court denied this request.91 
86. Id.
87. See Presidential Statement on the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
Policy, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRESS DOC. 609 (Sept. 5, 2017) https://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700609/pdf/DCPD-201700609.pdf [https://perma.cc/89BE-
24V3] (“This is a gradual process, not a sudden phaseout. Permits will not begin to 
expire for another 6 months . . . . I am not going to just cut DACA off, but rather 
provide a window of opportunity for Congress to finally act.”). 
88. Order Denying FRCP 12(b)(1) Dismissal and Granting Provisional Relief,
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C17-05211 WHA, at 48 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018), https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/california 
/candce/3:2017cv05211/316722/234/0.pdf?ts=1515577022 [https://perma.cc/M 
5AE-MZLN]. The court ordered the government to “maintain the DACA program 
on a nationwide basis on the same terms and conditions as were in effect before the 
rescission on September 5, 2017,” but with the exceptions: 
(1) that new applications from applicants who have never before 
received deferred action need not be processed; (2) that the advance 
parole feature need not be continued for the time being for anyone; and 
(3) that defendants may take administrative steps to make sure fair 
discretion is exercised on an individualized basis for each renewal 
application. 
Id. 
89. Amended Memorandum & Order & Preliminary Injunction, Batalla Vidal
v. Nielsen, No. 16-CV-4756 (NGG) (JO), at 53–55 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2018),
https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/new-york/nyedce/1:2016cv04756 
/390395/255/0.pdf?ts=1518610640 [https://perma.cc/NJ5L-45LN]. The court 
imposed a preliminary injunction substantially similar to, and with exceptions 
substantially similar to, that imposed in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. order. Id. at 53. 
90. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/department-homeland-security-v-reg 
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After the two injunctions, the government moved to dismiss in 
both the New York and California actions, and also in analogous 
litigation in the United States District Courts for the District of 
Maryland92 and District of Columbia.93 The courts in all these actions 
granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss, although 
to different extents and for different reasons. Three of these four 
court orders were basically sympathetic to the plaintiffs,94 and the 
fourth (from Maryland) was broadly sympathetic to the 
government.95 
The injunctions against the President’s DACA rescission have 
had their effect. It was reported that during the first three months of 
2018, the Trump administration has approved tens of thousands of 
DACA applications and renewals.96 
E. Overview of the Judicial Response to the Trump Executive Orders 
The foregoing overview demonstrates that the judicial response 
to the four Trump Executive Orders has been singular. Every one of 
the Trump Executive Orders (including all three versions of the 
travel ban order) was enjoined by a federal district court. 
Furthermore, each of these injunctions that has been fully reviewed 
by a federal circuit court of appeal has been sustained. 
92. Casa de Md. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (D. Md. Mar.
5, 2018). 
93. NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2018).
94. In the New York case, the court ruled against the motion to dismiss on four
out of six numbered bases for proposed dismissal. Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. 
Supp. 3d 260, 285–86 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018). In the California case, the court 
ruled against the motion to dismiss on only two of the five numbered bases for 
proposed dismissal, but these two were arguably the most significant and 
substantive, concerning the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims. 
Order Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6), 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1316 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2018). In the District of Columbia case, the court ruled against 
the motion to dismiss on all but one of the eight numbered bases for proposed 
dismissal. NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 249. 
95. In the Maryland case, the court ruled in favor of the motion to dismiss on
all but one of the ten numbered bases for proposed dismissal. Casa de Md., 284 F. 
Supp. 3d at 758. 
96. Chantal da Silva, Is DACA Dead? Trump Administration Has Approved
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The consistency of the federal court reactions to the Trump 
Executive Orders is noteworthy. After all, the subject matter of the 
four orders is relatively wide-ranging. The transgender military 
exclusion memorandum has nothing to do with the other three. 
While the other three all concern immigration to some extent, they 
address immigration from varying angles: the travel ban order 
purportedly addresses immigration from the standpoint of security 
against terrorism; the sanctuary jurisdictions order is addressed to 
the behavior of United States jurisdictions rather than the 
immigrants themselves; and the DACA rescission statement 
addresses persons already with the United States for reasons apart 
from security against terrorism. Given the variety of the factual 
circumstances addressed by each order, the consistency of the 
response of the federal courts has been remarkable. 
It is true that the Supreme Court stayed the injunctions against 
the travel ban order in the context of setting oral argument 
regarding its review of them. For the moment, however, this stay is 
defensibly viewed as having a chiefly procedural character, and does 
not materially reduce the significance of this consistency of 
approach. Even if the Supreme Court ultimately invalidates the 
injunctions, the consistent views of the district courts and circuit 
courts of appeal will have been noteworthy.  
III. EXCLUSIONARY EFFECT OF THE TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDERS
The common effect of the Trump Executive Orders is 
exclusionary as a whole. The first two travel ban orders 
excluded—and the third travel ban order continues to 
exclude—immigrants from the named countries.97 The sanctuary 
jurisdictions order attempts to exclude certain cities and counties 
from receiving federal grants.98 The transgender military exclusion 
memoranda attempt to exclude, of course, transgender persons 
from the military.99 Finally, the DACA rescission statement attempts 
97. First Travel Ban Order, supra note 16, § 3(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8978; Second
Travel Ban Order, supra note 27, § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213; Third Travel Ban 
Order, supra note 33, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45165–67. 
98. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, supra note 43,
§ 9(a), 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
99. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, supra note
60, § 2(a). 
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to exclude the young people it covers from remaining in the United 
States.100 
The current litigation environment surrounding the Trump 
Executive Orders does not detract from their exclusionary character. 
To the extent any of the current injunctions are invalidated, the 
corresponding order(s) will, at that point, have the exclusionary 
effects noted above. The discharge provisions of the original 
transgender exclusion were supposed to become effective on March 
23, 2018.101 Now, if and when the current injunctions are invalidated, 
the new version of the transgender exclusion memorandum will take 
effect at that point. 
The full effect of the DACA rescission was also not to have been 
felt until March 2018.102 The fact that intervening injunctions have 
suspended the rescission for the moment does not detract from the 
rescission’s intended exclusionary effects. These exclusions seem to 
advance a policy of stasis, seeking to revert policy to the status quo 
before the Obama administration took office. 
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDERS
A. Constitutional Travel Ban Cases Further Develop an Expansive 
Interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
The courts that have enjoined the travel ban orders have either 
chosen constitutional or statutory bases for injunction.103 This article 
focuses on the analysis of the courts that have chosen constitutional 
bases for injunction and their reliance on the Establishment Clause. 
However, these courts use a type of Establishment Clause application 
that has been unusual over the years. Accordingly, these cases have 
the expansive effect of resurrecting a branch of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence that had been somewhat dormant.  
100. DACA Rescission Statement, supra note 85. 
 101. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, supra note 
60, § 3. 
102. See Presidential Statement on the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
Policy, supra note 87. 
 103. See, e.g., Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1134–39 (D. Haw. 2017) 
(justifying injunction under Establishment Clause principles); Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 601, 604–05 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing the 
Establishment Clause as the constitutional basis for injunction). 
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The relevant concept in this unusual application is the second 
element of the Lemon test. The test comes from Lemon v. Kurtzman,104 
a 1971 Supreme Court case invalidating state-funding for teacher 
compensation of secular subjects in private schools.105 In striking 
down the state program, the Court enunciated the now-familiar 
Lemon test. The test provides that a governmental action (in that 
case, a state statute) will avoid violation of the Establishment Clause 
if three circumstances pertain: 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; [and] finally, the 
statute must not foster an “excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”106 
An interesting aspect of the Lemon test is the phrase “nor 
inhibits” in the second element of the test.107 It has been observed 
by at least one expert that this phrase is somewhat confusing in the 
Establishment Clause context.108 The Establishment Clause has its 
roots in the fear of governmental adoption of a particular religion as 
the state religion, directly or indirectly.109 Any such governmental 
adoption is concerned primarily with advancing the chosen religion. 
The adoption of one religion can be viewed as the inhibition of 
others. But the serious inhibition of any religion is most effectively 
challenged under the Free Exercise Clause, rather than the 
Establishment Clause. Yet, the second element of the Lemon test uses 
the “inhibition of religion” as an element of an Establishment Clause 
analysis.110 
The Supreme Court has used the Lemon test in many of its 
decisions.111 However, the only major Supreme Court case in which 
104. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
105. See id. at 614–22. 
106. Id. at 612–13 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) 
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970))). 
107. Id. 
 108. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 
1380–85 (1981) (suggesting that the “inhibits” phrase is a “source of confusion” in 
attempting to interpret and apply the Lemon test). 
109. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Construction and Application of Establishment Clause 
of First Amendment—U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 15 A.L.R. FED. 2d 573 (2006). 
110. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
 111. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cty., Ky. v. 
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. 
17
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this “nor inhibits religion” aspect of Establishment Clause doctrine 
was used as part of a holding was Larson v. Valente.112 This 1982 case 
invalidated a Minnesota statute regulating solicitation by some, but 
not all, religious groups.113 Other than this sole application, other 
Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases before and since Larson 
have not relied on the “nor inhibits religion” aspect of the Lemon 
test. 
However, those federal decisions that found the various versions 
of the travel ban order to violate the Establishment Clause 
necessarily relied on this “nor inhibits religion” aspect of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. To take the most recent 
example, the October 17, 2017, ruling by the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Maryland, in framing the Establishment Clause issue, 
emphasized that the travel ban was “motivated by a desire to ban 
Muslims as a group from entering the United States.”114 The focus 
on negative targeting under and Establishment Clause framework 
(as opposed to a Free Exercise Clause framework) attests to this 
rarely used “inhibits religion” aspect of Establishment Clause 
doctrine. 
B. Sanctuary Jurisdictions Case Deploys Conventional Constitutional 
Concepts to Reach Novel Results 
When the federal district court in Northern California—in the 
Santa Clara/San Francisco litigation115—acted against the sanctuary 
jurisdictions order, both at the preliminary injunction and 
permanent injunction stages, it relied on the same rationale. It did 
not rely on the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Equal Protection Clause, or indeed any portion of the Constitution 
generally thought to protect individual rights by the Constitution’s 
terms. Instead, it relied on violations of Separation of Powers 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
112. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
 113. Under the statute (as in effect at the time the case was decided), “only those 
religious organizations that received more than half of their total contributions 
from members or affiliated organizations would [be] exempt from the registration 
and reporting requirements” imposed by the statute. Id. at 231–32. 
114.  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 619 (D. 
Md. 2017). 
115.  See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
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principles,116 the Spending Clause,117 the Tenth Amendment,118 and 
the Fifth Amendment vagueness119 and Due Process concerns.120 
As noted elsewhere, Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment 
arguments are more characteristically advanced by judges and 
justices considered to be conservative.121 They are structural 
arguments designed to protect local governments from being 
commandeered as arms of, and to protect local officials from being 
pressed into service as agents of, the federal government.122 In the 
most prominent Supreme Court cases denouncing these effects of 
commandeering local government and pressing local officials into 
federal service, the ultimate result has been in line with policy results 
often favored by political conservatives. The anti-commandeering 
imperative was established in New York v. United States,123 and resulted 
in the invalidation of a federal scheme regulating the disposal of low-
level radioactive waste.124 Particular antagonism against pressing 
local officials into federal service was cemented in United States v. 
Printz.125 The Court in Printz held the federal regulatory regime 
regarding background checks for gun purchases invalid.126 Similarly, 
the Court most recently used a Spending Clause argument to protect 
state autonomy when invalidating aspects of President Obama’s 
Affordable Care Act.127  
But the Federal District Court for the Northern District of 
California used these doctrines, most frequently associated with 
advancing conservative policies, to invalidate President Trump’s 
 116. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 530–32 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
25, 2017). 
117. Id. at 532–33. 
118. Id. at 533–34. 
119. Id. at 534–36. 
120. Id. at 536. 
121. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutionality of Withholding Federal Funds from 
Sanctuary Cities, 40 L.A. LAW 60, 60 (2017) (“Ironically, this type of coercion of local 
governments [deployed in the sanctuary jurisdictions order] violates principles of 
federalism long advocated by the conservative justices on the Supreme Court.”). 
 122. Id. (“The federal government cannot turn local governments into 
enforcement arms of the federal government.”). 
123. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
124. Id. at 188. 
125. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
126. See id. at 935. 
127. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575–85 (2012); see also 
Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 60. 
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sanctuary jurisdictions order,128—thereby halting a measure 
considered to advance conservative policies. Its reaction to the 
sanctuary jurisdictions order was therefore another example of the 
ways the Trump Executive Orders have resulted in judicial rulings 
that expand upon previous arguments in novel ways. 
This tendency continued through to most of the sanctuary 
jurisdictions cases decided in early 2018. In the Philadelphia case, 
the federal court in Eastern Pennsylvania determined that the City 
was likely to succeed on the merits, in substantial part because of 
Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause concerns.129 In the Los 
Angeles case, the federal court in Central California relied 
substantially on federalism concerns, including the Tenth 
Amendment, in granting summary judgment.130 And in the Chicago 
case, the Seventh Circuit cast its analysis in terms of separations of 
powers, but in doing so expressed substantial sensitivity to federalism 
concerns.131 
In the federal case brought by the State of California in the 
Northern District of California, the court denied the State’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction.132 Here, the court determined that 
Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment arguments did not allow 
the State to prevail.133 But this ruling was in contrast to the other 
judgments that were issued during this time period. This court’s 
rejection of these assertions arguably accentuates the notable 
tendency of the other courts to use them to advance the progressive 
measures of the cities involved in the other cases. 
 128. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 533–34 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
25, 2017). 
 129.  City of Phila. v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, 2018 WL 1305789, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 13, 2018). 
130.  City of L.A. v. Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1096 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 
2018). 
 131.  See City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 284 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 2018) 
(“None of [the] provisions [of the Byrne JAG Program statute] grant the Attorney 
General the authority to impose conditions that require states or local governments 
to assist in immigration enforcement . . . .”); see also id. at 285 (“[The Attorney 
General’s interpretation] is inconsistent with the goal of the [Byrne JAG Program] 
statute to support the needs of law enforcement while providing flexibility to state 
and local governments.”). 
 132.  California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015, at 1037 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 5, 2018). 
133.  Id. at 1033–36. 
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C. Transgender Exclusion Case Develops a Progressive Interpretation of 
Equal Protection 
A group of transgender service members, and transgender 
persons aspiring to become service members, sued the Trump 
administration shortly after the administration’s issuance of the first 
transgender military exclusion memorandum.134 The Federal 
District Court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary 
injunction, with national effect, against both the Accession and 
Retention Directives stated in the memorandum.135 
In granting these injunctions, the court determined that the 
plaintiffs had shown a likelihood to succeed on the merits of their 
claim based on the application of the Equal Protection Clause.136 
The court’s Equal Protection analysis was notably progressive. The 
court determined that “discrimination on the basis of someone’s 
transgender identity is a quasi-suspect form of classification that 
triggers heightened scrutiny.”137 While other federal district courts 
have determined that discrimination on the basis of transgender 
status is evaluated under intermediate scrutiny,138 such 
determinations are still comparatively rare. 
Indeed, there is no express determination to this effect at the 
level of the federal circuit courts of appeal. The Seventh Circuit 
determined in a recent en banc opinion139 that discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation constitutes sex discrimination within 
the meaning of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.140 But that is 
solely a statutory ruling, only pertaining within the Seventh Circuit, 
and applying to sexual orientation rather than explicitly regarding 
transgender status.141 
 134. Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17-1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 
30, 2017) (referring to the plaintiffs as “current and aspiring service members who 
are transgender”). 
135. See id. at *3–4 (setting forth the terms of the injunctions). 
136. See id. at *3. 
137. Id. at *28. 
138. See, e.g., Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
139. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). 
141. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343 (referring to the court’s task of determining “what 
it means to discriminate on the basis of sex,” and “whether actions taken on the 
basis of sexual orientation are a subset of actions taken on the basis of sex” as “a 
pure question of statutory interpretation”). 
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On November 21, 2017, the Federal District Court for the 
District of Maryland issued a preliminary injunction against the first 
transgender military exclusion memorandum.142 It voiced explicit 
support for the rationale expressed by the District of Columbia 
court: “[t]he Court finds persuasive the D.C. Court’s reasons for 
applying intermediate scrutiny.”143 The Maryland court further 
declared: “The Court also adopts the D.C. Court’s reasoning in the 
application of intermediate scrutiny to the Directives and finds that 
the Plaintiffs herein are likely to succeed on their Equal Protection 
claim.”144 
Although the degree of consensus among all federal circuit 
courts of appeal regarding discrimination on the basis of 
transgender status may be unclear, the rationale exhibited by both 
the Maryland and D.C. federal district courts, in enjoining the 
Accession and Retention Directives, is a distinctly progressive 
approach in the area of equal protection doctrine.145 
This tendency was accentuated when the Federal District Court 
for the Western District of Washington later issued its order partially 
granting and partially denying the parties’ opposing motions for 
summary judgment.146 Because the degree to which the defendants 
had satisfied their burden under equal protection analysis turned on 
facts as yet undeveloped in the record, the court denied summary 
judgment for the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.147 However, 
much more cogently, the court also engaged in a detailed equal 
protection classification analysis, and determined that “transgender 
people . . . are a suspect class,”148 such that “the applicable level of 
 142. Stone v. Trump, No. MJG–17–2459, 2017 WL 5589122, at *1 (D. Md. Nov. 
21, 2017). 
143. Id. at *15. 
144. Id. 
145. The District Court for the District of Columbia also held that the Accession 
and Retention Directives were subject to intermediate scrutiny because they were 
rooted in the failure of the current and aspiring service members to conform to 
gender stereotypes. Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17–1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042, at *27 
(D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017). 
 146.  Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *14 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 13, 2018). 
147.  Id. at *13. 
148.  Id. at *9. 
22
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 4
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol44/iss3/4
  
2018] TRUMP EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 929 
scrutiny . . . is strict scrutiny.”149 On this classification point, the court 
granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.150 
This aspect of the court’s order was noteworthy, not least 
because even government discrimination on the basis of sex warrants 
only intermediate scrutiny,151 rather than strict scrutiny. This 
determination by the federal district court in Seattle is thus an apt 
example of judicial interpretations that are moving progressively, in 
the face of the administration’s efforts to regress. 
D. The Current Litigation Environment for the DACA Rescission Appears 
to Support DACA 
A review of the current state of litigation concerning the DACA 
rescission appears to support DACA in two ways. First, there is no 
argument developed in current case law that DACA was initially 
unconstitutional. Second, the DACA rulings so far support the use 
of public statements by officials to help support an inference of 
discriminatory intent.  
1. Judicial Precedents for the DAPA Program Do Not Support
Constitutional Invalidation of the DACA Program
In rescinding the DACA program, Attorney General Sessions 
asserted that the DACA program was unconstitutional.152 There are 
no federal court decisions holding such. Instead, there are merely 
cases invalidating the DAPA program.153 But these cases made no 
findings of constitutional violations. 
149.  Id. at *14. 
150.  Id. 
151.  The Supreme Court’s insistence that government discrimination on the 
basis of sex be evaluated according to intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict 
scrutiny, goes back to 1976. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating that 
sex-based classifications “must serve important governmental objectives and must 
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”). It is true that the 
intermediate scrutiny applied to cases of official sex discrimination was tightened 
somewhat under United States v. Virginia. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (explaining that 
the burden of justification for official classification based on gender “is 
demanding . . ., rests entirely on the State . . ., must be genuine . . ., [and] must not 
rely on overbroad generalizations”). But that case did not hold that the intermediate 
scrutiny test put forward in Craig v. Boren was no longer the correct test. 
152. DACA Rescission Statement, supra note 85. 
 153. See Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Texas v. United States, 
787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 
2015). 
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It is true that throughout the life of the DAPA program, 
objectors asserted that it was an unconstitutional violation of 
separation of powers principles.154 After all, it was the codification, 
in some sense, of a deployment of executive prosecutorial discretion 
in ways that ran counter to the policy preferences of the 
congressional majority. However, when the Federal District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas enjoined the DAPA program in 
2015, it did not do so on constitutional grounds. Instead, it 
determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim 
that DAPA violated the procedural requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).155 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the injunction on the basis of a substantial likelihood of 
success on both the procedural156 and substantive157 claims of the 
plaintiffs under the APA. Thus, the Fifth Circuit ruling also avoided 
constitutional issues. 
It is significant that the Texas federal courts chose violations of 
the APA, rather than constitutional bases for enjoining the DAPA 
program. Given the degree of hostility of the detractors of DAPA to 
the program, and the degree to which constitutional violations were 
asserted regarding DAPA in public discourse, a decision to avoid 
legal resolution on those assertions may well reflect timidity or 
uncertainty as to the legal strength of those constitutional 
arguments. In any event, the failure of the courts to condemn DAPA 
on constitutional grounds is certainly more encouraging to 
proponents of DAPA and DACA than would have been a 
constitutional invalidation. 
By contrast, in his statement announcing rescission of the DACA 
program, Attorney General Sessions both specifically relied on 
constitutional precepts and mischaracterized the actions of the 
Texas federal courts in the DAPA case. He announced that “[o]ur 
collective wisdom” was that DACA was “vulnerable to the same legal 
and constitutional challenges that the courts recognized with respect 
 154. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama 
Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/ 
24/us/supreme-court-immigration-obama-dapa.html    [https://perma.cc/MT82- 
J87Q] (quoting Ken Paxton, Texas Attorney General, stating “[t]his is a major 
setback to President Obama’s attempts to expand executive power, and a victory for 
those who believe in the separation of powers and the rule of law”). 
155. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 677. 
156. Texas, 787 F.3d at 762–66. 
157. Id. at 767–68. 
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to the DAPA program.”158 He thus incorrectly asserted that the 
courts had enjoined DAPA on constitutional bases as well as the APA 
bases. 
He then acknowledged that the APA was the basis of the court 
DAPA injunctions, by stating that “[t]he Fifth Circuit specifically 
concluded that DACA had not been implemented in a fashion that 
allowed sufficient discretion, and that DAPA was ‘foreclosed by 
Congress’s careful plan.’”159 But he then mischaracterized the Fifth 
Circuit conclusion by inaccurately paraphrasing it: “In other words, 
[DAPA] was inconsistent with the Constitution’s separation of 
powers.”160 In fact, there is no specific mention of separation of 
powers in the Fifth Circuit opinion; the substantial bases of action 
for both court rulings depend completely on statutory objections 
based in the APA.161 
The Trump administration’s mischaracterization of the DAPA 
court actions, while still insisting that the rescission is based on 
constitutional precepts, can be seen to actually weaken the 
constitutional assertions. Not only do the Texas federal courts not 
address separation of powers issues in their rulings, but the 
administration’s continued insistence that they do can be seen to 
accentuate the fact that they do not. 
In the context of the Trump Executive Orders as a grouping of 
executive actions, this aspect of the DACA rescission statement plays 
into the progressive notion that the innovations expressed in the 
DACA program were actually constitutionally unobjectionable. 
Accordingly, in the example of the DACA rescission statement as 
well, the administration’s attempt to advance a policy of stasis 
actually results in judicial opinions that undercut the constitutional 
arguments supporting the administration’s actions. 
2. DACA Rulings Currently Support Reference to Public Statements
by Officials as Bases for Helping to Determine Discriminatory
Intent
For purposes of this review, it is salient to observe the approach 
toward equal protection arguments taken by the courts addressing 
158. DACA Rescission Statement, supra note 85, ¶ 14. 
159. Id. at ¶ 15. 
160. Id. at ¶16. 
161. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 762–67 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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the DACA rescission. The federal courts in California162 and New 
York163 determined that candidate Trump’s pre-election and 
post-election statements disparaging Latina and Latino 
immigrants—especially Mexicans—could be an indication of a 
discriminatory purpose for the DACA rescission. The Maryland 
court determined that such statements should not be so 
interpreted.164 The District of Columbia ruling, although broadly 
sympathetic to the plaintiffs, was based solely on statutory issues and 
thus did not address equal protection.165 
The extent to which public statements by governmental 
figures—before or after election—should be used to indicate 
intentional discrimination is controversial. The controversy was 
illustrated perhaps most cogently by the treatment of public 
statements in the Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi 
 162.  The California court broadly noted that “in analyzing whether a facially-
neutral policy was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, district courts must 
consider factors such as whether the policy creates a disparate impact, the historical 
background and sequence of events leading up to the decision, and any relevant 
legislative or administrative history.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1314 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2018) (citation 
omitted). The court went on to note, for example, that the DACA rescission “had a 
disproportionate impact on Latinos and Mexican nationals,” adding that plaintiffs 
had alleged “a history of bias leading up to the rescission of DACA in the form of 
campaign statements and other public comments by President Trump . . . .” Id. 
 163.  The New York court noted that “[p]laintiffs identify a disheartening 
number of statements made by President Donald Trump that allegedly suggest that 
he is prejudiced against Latinos and, in particular Mexicans.”  Batalla Vidal v. 
Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 276. After cataloging and reviewing certain statements 
made by the President, the court concluded that “these allegations are sufficiently 
racially charged, recurring, and troubling as to raise a plausible inference that the 
decision to end the DACA program was substantially motivated by discriminatory 
animus.” Id. at 277. 
 164.  For example, the Maryland court rejected what it called “Plaintiffs’ 
reliance on the President’s misguided, inconsistent, and occasionally irrational 
comments made to the media to establish an ulterior motive.” Casa de Md., 284 F. 
Supp. 3d 758, 774 (D. Md. Mar. 5, 2018). The court disparaged “judicial 
psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts,” and asserted that the President’s 
statements “have frequently shifted but have moderated since his election.” Id. at 
774–75. 
 165.  The D.C. court concluded that under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
“DACA’s rescission was arbitrary and capricious . . . .” NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. 
Supp. 3d 209, 215–16 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2018). The court also noted that, because it 
had already concluded that DACA’s rescission violated the Administrative 
Procedure Act, it was not necessary to address constitutional claims at this stage. Id. 
at 246. 
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Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.166 In that case, one segment of Justice 
Kennedy’s lead opinion used public statements made by individual 
city council members to show that ordinances and resolutions passed 
by the city council were impermissibly targeting religion.167 
The practice of consulting public statements of political 
officials—even during official proceedings—as a means of gauging 
the intent of the body’s official action was evidently viewed by the 
other justices as so problematic that only one other member of the 
Court (Justice Stevens) joined in that segment of Justice Kennedy’s 
lead opinion.168 However, the decision was unanimous as to its 
judgment, and a majority supported all of the lead opinion except 
for the segment concerning the public statements.169 This pattern 
indicates how controversial the use of such statements can be to 
judge discriminatory intent. Granted, the Hialeah case concerned 
free exercise of religion rather than equal protection, but there is no 
obvious principled reason why the desirability of using such 
statements should vary between the two contexts. 
The 2018 court orders addressing the DACA rescission tend to 
favor the use of public statements by officials to help show 
discriminatory intent. Two of the three courts explicitly favored 
doing so,170 only one explicitly did not,171 and the last favored a result 
analogous to those that did.172 Accordingly, the current state of the 
DACA rescission legislation is further advancing the use of such 
statements. This is a progressive direction, again at odds with the 
administration’s apparent desire to cut back on progressive 
approaches. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Trump Executive Orders were rooted in a desire to revert 
to the status quo ante regarding certain aspects of immigration 
policy and transgender military service—a time before the Obama 
administration embarked on innovation in those areas. They were 
166.  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
167.  Id. at 540–42 (Part II-A-2 of Justice Kennedy’s lead opinion). 
168.  Id. at 522, 540–42. 
169.  Justice White joined the lead opinion except as to Part II-A, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined all of the lead opinion 
except Part II-A-2. See id. at 522. 
170.  See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
171.  See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
172.  See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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thus based on a policy of stasis and resistance to certain kinds of 
change, while focusing on specific exclusion. 
Ironically, the judicial reaction to the Trump Executive Orders 
does not support this posture of stasis. The constitutional travel ban 
cases and the transgender ban case have used expansive applications 
of existing doctrine to reach their results. The sanctuary jurisdictions 
cases used conventional doctrines in novel ways to reach their 
results. The initial judicial responses to the types of executive actions 
involved in the DACA controversy failed to acknowledge a 
constitutional basis for complaint. And those cases that have been 
brought challenging the DACA rescission have advanced the 
controversial proposition that officials’ public statements can be 
used to help establish discriminatory intent. Accordingly, while the 
executive branch is currently pursuing stasis, the judicial reaction 
seems to be moving in the opposite direction toward expansion and 
novel applications of doctrine. 
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